We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem for a finite number of sessions (fixed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete with respect to a Dolev-Yao model of intruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports non-atomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in order to build an attack with a fixed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forge messages of linear size, provided that they are represented as dags.
Introduction
Even assuming perfect cryptography, the design of protocols for secure electronic transactions is highly errorprone and conventional validation techniques based on informal arguments and/or testing are not sufficient for meeting the required security level.
On the other hand, verification tools based on formal methods have been quite successful in discovering new flaws in well-known security protocols. These methods include state exploration using model-checking as in [19, 27, 8, 2] , logic programming [20] , term rewriting [10, 18] , tree automata [16, 9] or a combination of these techniques. Other approaches aim at proving the correctness of a protocol. They are based on authentication logics or proving security properties by induction using interactive proof-assistants (see [3, 24] ).
Although the general verification problem is undecidable [15] even in the restricted case where the size of messages is bounded [14] , it is interesting to investigate decidable fragments of the underlying logics and their complexity. The success of practical verification tools indicates that there may exist interesting decidable fragments that capture many concrete security problems. Dolev and Yao have proved that for simple ping-pong protocols, insecurity can be decided in polynomial time [12] . On the other hand [14] shows that when messages are bounded and when no nonces (i.e. new data) are created by the protocol and the intruder, then the existence
The Protocol Model
We consider a model of protocols in the style of [5] . The actions of any honest principal are specified as a partially ordered list that associates to (the format of) a received message its corresponding reply. The activity of the intruder is modeled by rewrite rules on sets of messages. We suppose that the initialization phase of distributing keys and other information between principals is implicit. The approach is quite natural and it is simple to compile a wide range of protocol descriptions into our formalism. For instance existing tools such as CAPSL [11] or CASRUL [18] would perform this translation with few modifications. We present our model more formally now.
Names and Messages
The messages exchanged during the protocol execution are built using pairing _, _ and encryption operators {_} s _ , {_} p _ . We add a superscript to distinguish between public key ( p ) and symmetric key ( s ) encryptions. The set of basic messages is finite and denoted by Atoms. It contains names for principals and atomic keys from the set Keys. Since we have a finite number of sessions we also assume any nonce is a basic message: we consider that it has been created before the session and belongs to the initial knowledge of the principal that generates it.
Any message can be used as a key for symmetric encryption. Only elements from Keys are used for public key encryption. Given a public key (resp. private key) k, k −1 denotes the associated private key (resp. public key) and it is an element of Keys. Given a symmetric key k then, k −1 will denote the same key.
The messages are then generated by the following (tree) grammar: For conciseness we denote by m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n the set of messages {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }. Given two sets of messages M and M we denote by M, M the union of their elements and given a set of messages M and a message t, we denote by M, t the set M ∪ {t}.
Protocol Specification
We shall describe protocols by a list of actions for each principal. In order to describe the protocol steps we introduce message terms (or terms for short). We assume that we have a finite set of variables V ar. Then the set of terms is generated by the following tree grammar: Let V ar(t) be the set of variables that occur in a term t. A substitution assigns terms to variables. A ground substitution assigns messages to variables. The application of a substitution σ to a term t is written tσ. We also write [x ← u] the substitution σ defined by σ(x) = u and σ(y) = y for y = x. The set of subterms of t is denoted by Sub(t). These notations are extended to sets of terms E in a standard way. For instance, Eσ = {tσ | t ∈ E}.
A principal (except the initiator) reply after receiving a message matching a specified term associated to its current state. Then from the previously received messages (and initial knowledge) he builds the next message he will send. This concrete message is obtained by instantiating the variables in the message pattern associated to the current step in the protocol specification.
A protocol is given with a finite set of principal names N ames ⊆ Atoms, and a partially ordered list of steps for each principal name. This partial order is to ensure that the actions of each principal are performed in the right order. More formally we associate to each principal A a partially ordered finite set (W A , < W A ). Each protocol step is specified by a pair of terms denoted R ⇒ S and is intended to represent some message R expected by a principal A and his reply S to this message. Hence a protocol specification P is given by:
where I = {(A, i) | A ∈ N ames and i ∈ W A }. We write |I| for the size of I. Init and End are fixed messages used to initiate and close a protocol session. An environment for a protocol is a set of messages. A correct execution order π is a one-to-one mapping π : I → {1, .., |I|} such that for all A ∈ N ames and i < W A j we have π(A, i) < π(A, j). In other words π defines an execution order for the protocol steps. This order is compatible with the partial order of each principal. A protocol execution is given by a ground substitution σ, a correct execution order π and a sequence of environments E 0 , .., E |I| verifying: Init ∈ E 0 , End ∈ E |I| , and for
Each step ι of the protocol extends the current environment by adding the corresponding message S ι σ when R ι σ is present. One can remark that principals are not allowed to generate any new data such as nonces. But this is not a problem when the number of sessions is finite: in this setting from the operational point it is equivalent to assume that the new data generated by a principal during a protocol execution is part of his initial knowledge.
Example: Needham Schroeder protocol
Let us give a variant of the Needham Schroeder protocol in our setting. We assume that every nonce is included in the initial knowledge of the principal that will create it and that a principal A who wishes to communicate with B will send his public key (instead of his name in the standard version):
The orderings on steps are the ones that are expected:
We do not consider that the protocol specification is a set of rules such that the scope of the variables occurring in a rule is restricted to this rule. On the contrary, the variables are global in our case and their scope may include several lines of the specification. Hence our modeling approach is different from the one in [14] . See for example the Otway-Rees protocol given in Section 2.
Intruder
In the Dolev Yao model [12] the intruder has the ability to eavesdrop, to divert and memorize messages, to compose and decompose, to encrypt and decrypt when he has the key, to generate new messages and send them to other participants with a false identity. We assume here without loss of generality that the intruder systematically diverts messages, possibly modifies them and forwards them to the receiver under the identity of the official sender. In other words all communications are mediated by a hostile environment represented by the intruder. The intruder actions for modifying the messages are simulated by rewrite rules on sets of messages. The rewrite relation is defined by M → M if there exists one of the rule l → r in the Table 1 such that l is a subset of M and M is obtained by replacing l by r in M . We write → * for the reflexive and transitive closure of →.
The set of messages S 0 represents the initial knowledge of the intruder. We assume that at least the name of the intruder Charlie belongs to this set.
Intruder rules are divided in several groups: rules for composing or decomposing messages. These rewrite rules are the only one we consider in this paper and any mentions of "rules" refer to these rules. In the following a, b and c represent any message and K represents any element of Key. For instance, the rule with label L c ( a, b ) replaces a set of messages a, b by the following set of messages a, b, a, b .
See Table 1 for complete the intruder rules, and Section 5 for an extension. We denote the application of a rule R to a set E of messages with result E by E → R E . We write L c = {L c (a) | for all messages a}, and 
Attacks
Considering a protocol specification and a special term Secret (called secret term), we say that there is an attack in N protocol sessions if the intruder can obtain the secret term in its knowledge set after completing at most N sessions. We consider first the case of a single session. Then we shall sketch in Subsection 3.4 how to reduce the case of several sessions to the unique session case.
Since received messages are matched by principals with the left-hand sides of protocol steps, meaning that some substitution unify the messages sent by the intruder and waited by the principals, the existence of an attack can be expressed as a constraint solving problem: is there a way for the intruder to build from its initial knowledge and already sent messages a new message (defined by a substitution for the variables of protocol steps) that will be accepted by the recipient, and so on, until the end of the session, and such that at the end the secret term is known by the intruder.
We introduce now a predicate f orge for checking whether a message can be constructed by the intruder from some known messages. This predicate can be viewed as the combination of predicates synth and analz from L. Paulson [24] . Definition 1 (forge) Let E be a set of terms and let t be a term such that there is E with E → * E and t ∈ E . Then we say that t is forged from E and we denote it by t ∈ f orge(E).
Let k be the cardinality of I, i.e. the total number of steps of the protocol. An attack is a protocol execution where the intruder can modify each intermediate environment and where the message Secret belongs to the final environment. In an attack the intruder is able to forge any message expected by a principal by using its initial knowledge and already sent messages (spied in the environments). This means, formally, that a given protocol execution, with sequence of environments E 0 , .., E k , is an attack if for all
. However by definition t ∈ f orge(E) iff there is E such that E → * t, E . Hence we can reformulate the definition of an attack using the predicate F orge: Definition 2 (attack) Given a protocol P = {R ι ⇒ S ι | ι ∈ I}, a secret message Secret and assuming the intruder has initial knowledge S 0 , an attack is described by a ground substitution σ and a correct execution order
Before proceeding let us give as a detailed example an attack with Otway-Rees protocol.
Example: Otway-Rees Protocol
The participants of the protocols are A, B and the server S. The symmetric keys Kas, Kbs will be respectively shared by the participants (A, S), (B, S). The identifiers M, N a, N b represents nonces. In Step 3, the server S creates the new secret symmetric key Kab to be used by A and B for further safe communications. We have added an extra step (5) in order to show how Kab is applied by A to send a secret message to B. In the attack, A will be fooled into believing that the term < M, A, B > is in fact the new key. The sequence of messages defining Otway-Rees is: 
An execution can be obtained by taking the protocol steps in the given order and by applying the following substitution:
An attack can be performed on this protocol with initial intruder knowledge S 0 = {Charlie, init}, using:
We introduce now a measure on attacks and a notion of minimal attack among all attacks, called a normal attack. We shall prove in the next sections that normal attacks have polynomial bounds for a suitable representation of terms.
The size of a message term t is denoted |t| and defined as:
• |t| = 1 for any t ∈ Atoms, except for Charlie where |Charlie| = 0.
• and recursively by | x, y | = |{x} y | = |x| + |y| + 1
Note that Charlie is the minimal size message. We recall that a finite multiset over natural numbers is a function M from IN to IN with finite domain. We shall use a more intuitive set-like notation for them: {2, 2, 2, 5} will denote the function M such that M (5) = 1, M (2) = 3 and M (x) has value 0 otherwise. We shall compare finite multisets of naturals by extending the ordering on IN as follows:
Equivalently > > is the smallest ordering on multisets of naturals such that:
For instance {3, 1, 1, 1}> {2, 2, 2, 1}. We shall now define a normal attack as an attack such that the multiset of the sizes of all messages exchanged by the principals and the intruder during the protocol session is minimal for the multiset ordering on IN .
Definition 3 (normal attack) Given a protocol
Clearly if there is an attack there is a normal attack since the measure is a well-founded ordering on finite multisets of nonnegative integers. Note also that a normal attack is not necessarily unique. We now present a NP procedure for detecting the existence of a normal attack.
Existence of a Normal Attack is in NP
A key ingredient for proving membership in NP is the representation of messages as Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). This is motivated by the fact that we can encode easily the term unification problem as an insecurity problem and that it is well known that the unifier of two terms may have exponential size when the terms are represented as trees. For instance the following protocol is subject to an attack if and only if the terms s and t are unifiable. We assume that x 1 , . . . , x n are the variables occurring in s, t and that K is a key known only to A and B.
((A, 1),
Hence with a tree representation it would require exponential space to write the substitution associated to an attack guessed in a non-deterministic procedure for insecurity.
We first show some basic facts on the DAG-representation of message terms. Then we shall show how to obtain from any derivation a more compact one. We will then be able to prove that a normal attack has a polynomial size w.r.t. the size of the protocol and intruder knowledge, when using DAG representations.
Preliminaries
The DAG-representation of a set E of message terms is the graph (V, E) with labeled edges, where:
• the set of vertices V = Sub(E), the set of subterms of E.
• the set of edges E: {v s
Remark 1 The DAG representation is unique.
If n is the number of elements in Sub(t), one can remark that (V, E) has at most n nodes and 2.n edges. Hence its size is linear in n, and for convenience we shall define the DAG-size of E, denoted by |E| DAG , to be the number of distinct subterms of E, i.e the number of elements in Sub(E). For a term t, we simply write |t| DAG for |{t}| DAG .
Lemma 1 For all set of terms E, for all variables x and for all messages t, we have: |E[x ← t]| DAG ≤ |E, t| DAG
Proof: Given a set of terms E, a variable x and a message t, we want to show:
Let us first remark that we have |t, t| DAG = |t| DAG . We recall that Sub(E ) denotes the set of subterms of E . We introduce a function f : Sub(E[x ← t]) −→ Sub(E, t) and we show that f is one-to-one. Let us define
When several α are possible in the definition above then we take one arbitrarily. Let us show that f is one-to-one.
•
This proves the property, since the DAG-size of a set of terms is equal to number of distinct subterms they contain.
Guess a correct execution order π
2. Guess a ground substitution such that for all x ∈ V , σ(x) has DAG-size ≤ n.
3. For each i ∈ {1, ..., k + 1} guess an ordered list l i of n rules whose principal terms have DAGsize ≤ n.
For each
6. If each check is successful then answer YES. 
Corollary 1 For all set of terms E, for all ground substitutions γ, we have |Eγ|
DAG ≤ |E, γ(x 1 ), .., γ(x k )| DAG where {x 1 , .., x k } is
the set of variables in V ar. (recall that V ar is finite).
Proof: We simply apply Lemma 1 above for each x i .
Remark 2 We only need polynomial time to check that a rule l → l, r can be applied to E and to compute the resulting DAG E , when we have already a DAG-representation of E, l and r . This is due to the fact that we only need to first check that all terms in l are also in E and then to compute the DAG-representation E of E, r .
We are now going to present a NP decision procedure for finding an attack, assuming an attack exists. The procedure amounts to guess a correct execution order π, a possible ground substitution σ, with a DAG-size polynomially bounded, and k+1 lists of rules of length n 2 , and finally to check that when applying these lists of rules the intruder can build all expected messages as well as the secret.
We assume that we are given a protocol specification
, a secret message Secret and a finite set of messages S 0 for initial intruder knowledge. If P, S 0 is not given in DAG-representation, they are first converted to this format (in polynomial time). We assume that the DAG-size of P, S 0 is n, the finite set of variables in P is V , and |I| = k.
The NP procedure for checking the existence of an attack is written in Figure 1 . To prove the correction of this procedure we shall show that we can put a bound on the length of normal attacks. We will first give properties about derivations. We will also give polynomial bounds on the substitution σ that is used in a normal attack.
Derivations
In this section, we will give some useful definitions and properties of derivations. We shall introduce a notion of normal derivation, denoted by Deriv t (E). A related notion of normal derivation has been studied in [8] . Rather than a natural deduction presentation in [8] we use here term rewriting.
Definition 4 Given a derivation
For instance if t ∈ f orge(E) there exists a derivation with goal t: we take a derivation D = E → R 1 . . . → Rn E with t ∈ E and then we take the smallest prefix of D containing t.
This allows us to define some normal derivation, i.e. derivation minimal in length:
Definition 5 We denote Deriv t (E) a derivation of minimal length among the derivations from E with goal t (chosen arbitrarily among the possible ones).
In order to bound the length of such derivations, we can prove the two following lemmas: every intermediate term in Deriv t (E) is a subterm of E or t. 1 [t ] must be in L d (if not, the decomposition would be useless and the derivation would not be minimal): we can iterate this reasoning on t 1 [t ] , and this ends the proof: t increases strictly at each iteration and the derivation only contains a finite number of terms.
Lemma 2 If there exists t such that
L d (t ) ∈ Deriv t (E) then t is a subterm of E Proof: Let D = Deriv t (E). By minimality of D, we have L c (t ) ∈ D.Then either t ∈ E and we have the conclusion of the lemma. Otherwise there exists a rule L d (t 1 [t ]) in D generating t . But any rule in D generating t
Lemma 3 If there exists t such that
Hence either t ∈ {t} ∪ E and the lemma is proved. Otherwise there is at last one rule using t : if not, L c (t ) would be useless and Deriv t (E) not minimal. Then we have two cases to consider. In the first case, there exists a such that L d ({a} t −1 ) ∈ D, hence {a} t −1 is a subterm of E by the Lemma 2, and so is t . In the second case, there exists b such that L c ({t
In this case, we can iterate this reasoning on t 1 = {t } b or t 1 = {b} t . This ends the proof, because t strictly increases at each iteration and the derivation only contain a finite number of terms.
We show in the next proposition that there always exists derivations of a term t from a set E with a number of rules bounded by the DAG-size of initial and final terms t, E. This will be very useful to bound the length of the derivations involved in the research of an attack.
Proposition 1 For any set of terms E and for any term t, if Deriv
Proof: Let us prove that the number of steps in Deriv t (E) is at most |t, E| DAG by examining the terms composed or decomposed for any rule R that has been applied in Deriv t (E). From Lemma 2 every term decomposed (with L d ) is derived from E by decompositions exclusively. Hence every term which is decomposed was a subterm of E and is counted in |E| DAG . From Lemma 3 every term composed (by L c ) is used as a subterm of a key or of t. Hence it is counted in |t, E| DAG . Every rule R either composes or decomposes a term, but R never composes (resp. decomposes) a term which has already been composed (resp. decomposed). Hence to each subterm of E or t corresponds at most one rule application in Deriv t (E) for composing or decomposing it. (merging identical subterms)
Hence the number of terms composed or decomposed in Deriv t (E) is bounded by the number of distinct subterms of E, t and the first part of the result follows. Since each intermediate term is a subterm of E, t, the second part of the proposition follows.
Another kind of useful derivations is shown in the following Proposition 2: we can choose derivations such that a given term γ is never decomposed assuming some conditions. It will allow us to prove the Lemma 4.
Proposition 2 Let t ∈ f orge(E) and γ ∈ f orge(E) be given with Deriv γ (E) ending with an application of a rule in L c . Then there is a derivation D with goal t starting from E, and verifying
L d (γ) / ∈ D
Proof: Let t ∈ f orge(E) and γ ∈ f orge(E) be given with Deriv γ (E) ending with an application of a rule in
Then D is a correct derivation, since D generates α and β which are the two direct subterms of γ (γ is obtained by a composition). D does not contain a decomposition L d of γ from the fact that Deriv γ (E) has γ as goal, otherwise the last composition would be useless.
Hence D satisfies L d (γ) / ∈ D and the lemma follows.
Polynomial Bounds on Normal Attacks
We shall prove that when there exists an attack then a normal attack can always be constructed from subterms that are already occurring in the problem specification. This will allow to give bounds on the messages sizes and on the number of rewritings involved in such an attack. Hence let us assume a protocol P = {R ι ⇒ S ι | ι ∈ I}, a secret message Secret and a set of messages S 0 as the initial intruder knowledge. We assume that there exists an attack described by a ground substitution σ and a correct execution order π : I −→ 1, . . . , k (where k is the cardinality of I). We define R i = R π −1 and
We also define: SP as the set of subterms of the terms in the set P = {R j | j = 1, . . . , k} ∪ {S j | j = 0, . . . , k}, and SP ≤i the set of subterms of the terms in
We assume without loss of generality that Charlie ∈ S 0 i.e. the intruder initially knows its name !
Definition 6 Let t and t be two terms and θ a ground substitution. Then t is a θ-match of t if t is not a variable and tθ = t . This will be denoted by t θ t
The following lemma is a key property of this paper. It allows us to prove that every substitution σ in a normal attack is only built with parts of the protocol specification. In this way, we will be able to prove that all substitution σ in a normal attack has a DAG-size bounded by a polynomial in the protocol DAG-size.
Lemma 4 Given a normal attack σ, for all variable x, there exists t σ σ(x) such that t ∈ SP.
Proof: Let σ be a normal attack, and let us first assume that there exists x such that for all t such that t σ σ(x) we have t ∈ SP, and let us derive a contradiction. Let us define N x = min{j | σ(x) ∈ SP ≤j }. N x is the first step of the protocol whose message contains σ(x) as a subterm, and N x = 0 since σ(x) is not a subterm of S 0 . However since for all t such that t σ σ(x), t is not in SP, there exists a variable y which is subterm of R Nx or S Nx such that σ(x) is a subterm of σ(y). (Otherwise there would exist a σ-match of σ(x) with some subterm of R Nx ). Then let us show now the following claim:
is a subterm of R Nx σ and since R Nx σ ∈ f orge(S 0 σ, ...., S Nx−1 σ), we have:
• Otherwise, we will prove by induction that σ(x) occurs as a subterm in every intermediate set E i . We have σ(x) subterm of E n since R Nx σ ∈ E n , and:
, then s and σ(x) are subterms of E j−1 .
-If such a rule L j does not exist, then σ(x) is a subterm of E 0 and the iteration is finished.
This iteration implies that σ(x) is a subterm of E
But it is impossible due to the choice of N x .
end
Hence there exists a derivation Deriv σ(x) (S 0 σ, ...., S Nx−1 σ) and we can notice that its last step uses necessarily a composition rule since otherwise Lemma 2 would imply that σ(x) is a subterm of S 0 σ, ...., S Nx−1 σ, and therefore a contradiction.
Let us define the substitution σ to be equal to σ on all variables except for x where σ (x) = Charlie. We will prove that σ defines an attack with the same execution order than σ. Since σ is an attack, for all j,
Let us build from this derivation a new one where each σ(x) is replaced by Charlie. We shall denote by tδ the term obtained from t by replacing every occurrence of σ(x) by Charlie. For convenience we shall consider that E → E is a derivation step justified by the identity rule ∅. Then we shall prove that there exists a valid derivation:
where every rule L i is either L i or ∅. Hence we only have to take the same rules as in the initial derivation but possibly skip some steps. More precisely let us show that for i = 1 . . .
Finally we get for all j, R j σ ∈ f orge(S 0 σ , .., S j−1 σ ). Hence it follows that σ is an attack for the same protocol order than σ. Since σ is obtained from σ by simply replacing the value of x by a strictly smaller one (w.r. 
• Assume that we have built
We obtain:
Finally, this construction terminates since y∈Vp |σ(y)| strictly decreases. At the end we get V p = ∅ and
The consequence of Theorem 1 is that the DAG-size of the messages that are sent or received during a normal attack is bounded by a polynomial in the DAG size of the protocol. This result has crucial practical implications since it means that when searching for an attack we can give a simple a priori bound on the dag-size of the messages needed to be forged by the intruder: 
Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is in NP Single Session Case
We recall here the NP procedure for checking the existence of an attack and show its correctness. We assume given a protocol specification {(ι, R ι ⇒ S ι ) | ι ∈ I}. Let P = {R ι , S ι | ι ∈ I}, a secret message Secret and a finite set of messages S 0 for initial intruder knowledge. If P, S 0 is not given in DAG-representation, they are first converted to this format (in polynomial time). We assume that the DAG-size of P, S 0 is n, the finite set of variables in P is V , and |I| = k. Let us first remark that the procedure written in Section 3.1 is NP:
• A correct execution order is a permutation of I, and can be guessed in polynomial time.
• Since σ(x) has DAG-size ≤ n, one can choose a DAG representation of σ(x) in time O(n) and σ in O(n 2 ).
• Since each rule in l i has DAG-size ≤ n and since l i has at most n rules, one can choose each l i in time O(n 2 ), and all l i in time O(n 3 ). Remark: each term in the rules is in DAG representation.
• Computing the result E of the application of a rule L x (t) on E, with E and t in DAG representation, can be done in polynomial time in the DAG-size of E by Remark 2. So, checking that all l i are correctly applied takes polynomial time of n. To verify that R i σ is in the last set of terms takes obviously polynomial time too.
We can now see that this procedure is correct since it answers YES if and only if the protocol has an attack. If an attack exists, then one of the smallest attacks on this protocol is a normal attack, defining normal derivations which are possible guesses for the l i 's (and defining as well the execution order). On the other hand if the procedure answers YES, the checking performed on the guessed derivations proves that the protocol has an attack.
Multiple Sessions Case
We shall define the execution of several sessions of a protocol P as the execution of a single session for a more complex protocol P of size polynomial in |P | × m where m is the number of sessions. Therefore this will reduce immediately the security problem for several sessions to the security problem for one session and will show that the insecurity problem is in NP for multiple sessions too. We assume given a protocol specification P with its associated partial order < on the set of steps W . Let m be the number of sessions of this protocol we want to study, let V ar be the set of variables in P and let N onces be the set of nonces (a subset of Atoms) in P . The nonces are given fresh values at each new session by definition. Also variables from different sessions should be different. This is because we consider that in this model messages are not memorized from one session to another (except maybe by the intruder). Therefore we shall define n renaming functions ν i , for i = 1, .., m, as bijections from W ∪ N onces ∪ V ar to n new sets (mutually disjoint and disjoint from W ∪ N onces ∪ V ar) such that:
We assume that each set of steps W i for i = 1, .., m, is provided with a partial order < i such that for all w, w ∈ W and for all w i , w i ∈ W i , w < w iff w i < w i . Let P i be the protocol obtained by applying the renaming ν i to P . We have now n copy P i , i = 1, .., m, of the protocol. We combine them now into a unique protocol denoted m.P as follows. The set of steps is by definition the union Then applying the NP procedure for one session we derive immediately:
Theorem 2 Protocol insecurity for a finite number of sessions is decidable and in NP.

Remark 3 If we want to model n sequential sessions of the protocol instead of n parallel sessions, we only need to use a different order on the union of protocol steps
Hence this order forces one session to be finished before another one starts.
NP-hardness
We show now that the existence of an attack when the input are a protocol specification and initial knowledge of the intruder is NP-hard by reduction from 3-SAT. The proof is similar to the one given by [1] for their model, but does not need any conditional branching in the protocol specification. The propositional variables are x 1 , .., x n , and an instance of 3-SAT is 3 ) where ε i,j ∈ {0, 1} and x 0 (resp.x 1 ) means x (resp.¬x). Let us define:
The idea here is to use the intruder power to generate a first message, x 1,1 , . ., x n,3 , representing a (possible) solution for this 3-SAT problem. From this initial message A creates a term representing f applied to this solution. It will then be up to principals B to D to verify that it can really be reduced to T rue, with the help of the intruder for choosing the correct derivation. If this is the case, then E give the Secret term to the intruder, and the protocol has an attack. The description of this protocol follows :
Let us introduce now the following protocol (where variables x, y, z occurring in the description of step (U, j) should be considered as indexed by (U, j) ; the index is omitted for readability). Note also that the number of steps for each principal B . . . D is equal to the number of conjunctions in the 3-SAT instance.
5. otherwise in all remaining cases we take R = R.
Then we can notice that
Hence, the set of derivations with the same initial and final sets than D and verifying Condition 1 is not empty, and we can choose one of its elements minimal in length.
Hence from a derivation proving that t ∈ f orge(E) we can build another one verifying moreover Condition 1. The minimal prefix of this derivation that contains t is a derivation of goal t satisfying Condition 1, and this proves the lemma. Now, we only need to update the Deriv t (E) definition:
Definition 8 We denote Deriv t (E) a derivation of minimal length among the derivations from E with goal t and satisfying Condition 1 (chosen arbitrarily among the possible ones).
The rest of the proof is almost identical except that L c is replaced by L c and L r , and L d is replaced by L d and L s . Note that this model can still be improved since here the L s and L r rules are only applied at the top of messages: we could also consider cases where they are applied everywhere in terms.
Limiting the intruder
In this section we show how to reduce to our model other models where the intruder is unable (for some messages) to eavesdrop, divert and modify, or impersonate.
To prevent the intruder from eavesdropping between two steps (A, i) : ... ⇒ M 1 and (A, j) : M 2 ⇒ ..., we introduce a new symmetric key P only known by A and B and never published: With the steps (A, i) :
.., the intruder will never be able to intercept the message M 1 and send something else to B instead, even with the L r rules.
To prevent the intruder from diverting and modifying the message between the two steps above, we can use a new private key K A,i instead of P , and the steps (A, i) :
This way, if the intruder know K −1
A,i then he knows M 1 , but he cannot modify it, even with the L r rules. And since K A,i is only used for this step, the intruder can't use any other stored message.
To prevent the intruder from impersonating a message M sent by the principal A to B, we assume that there exists a private key K only known by the principals and never published (it never appears in the content of a message), and we assume that K −1 is known by everybody. Hence this amounts to replace M by { A, M } p K in A and B's steps: The intruder and the principals can read M , but the intruder will never be able to build a message in the name of A, even with the L r rules. (But he can use old A's messages if we used the same key K)
The new protocol has a linear size in the initial one, even in a dag representation.
Adding choice points
We extend the protocol model in order to allow for choice points. Typically the field of a message may contain information about the type of cryptography negotiated for the rest of the session. Hence the subsequent message exchanges may depend from the content of this field. We shall consider protocol descriptions where some steps (A, i) may be composed by priority blocks:
Two steps in the same priority block cannot be applied in the same execution, and ∀j, j , (A, (i, j)) < w A (A, (i + 1, j )). This block construction is similar to a case structure in programming languages. A protocol execution with substitution σ must now also satisfy: For every priority block (indexed by i), we apply step (A, (i, j)) if ∀j, ∀δ, R δ. For technical reasons, we introduce for each variable x, a term Charlie x that does not appear anywhere in the protocol description, that is initially known only by the intruder and such that |Charlie x | = 0. Then, an attack is now given by an order which is compatible with the given partial order and a substitution σ verifying the above steps conditions, the usual R i σ ∈ f orge(S 0 σ, .., S i−1 σ) and Secret ∈ f orge(S 0 σ, .., S n σ) conditions, and for all variables x, Charlie x may only appear in σ(x). This last condition does not restrict the intruder since he is not forced to use Charlie x .
First we can remark that all properties, lemmas, and proofs about derivations remain valid since we did not change the intruder rules. Therefore, the only proof to be adapted is the one of Lemma 4: We build a new substitution σ from σ , and we must prove that it still satisfies the requirements for an attack. To do that, we assume first that Charlie x is used instead of Charlie for σ(x) in the proof of the lemma.
We have R i σ ∈ f orge(S 0 σ , .., S i−1 σ ) and Secret ∈ f orge(S 0 σ , .., S n σ ). And for each attack step π −1 (k) = (A, (i, j)), we have R Since all bounds on derivations and attacks remain valid we only need to add to our insecurity detection procedure, an extra guessing step for the branches to be taken at choice points in order to derive a NP procedure for the more general case of protocols with choice.
Conclusion
By representing messages as dags we have been able to prove that when the number of sessions of a protocol is fixed, an intruder needs only to forge messages of linear size in order to find an attack. This result admits obvious practical implications since it gives an a priori bound on the space of messages to be explored for finding flaws in the protocol (with a model-checker, for instance).
Without Nonces
With Nonces No bounds [15] Undecidable Undecidable Infinite number of sessions, and bounded messages [14] DEXPTIME-complete Undecidable Finite number of sessions, choice points, and unbounded messages NP-complete NP-complete Finite number of sessions, and unbounded messages NP-complete NP-complete Table 3 : Complexity of known fragments
We have then derived the first NP-procedure for finding an attack with a fixed number of sessions and composed keys (also the first published decision procedure for this problem). This result matches the lower bound of the problem. Some related implementations have taken advantage of the thorough analysis in the NP membership proof and have been able to analyze in a fairly fast way the standard examples of the literature.
Several interesting variants of our model can be easily reduced to it. These variants are also quite easy to implement.
For instance we could consider that a principal is unable to recognize that a message supposed to be encrypted by some key K has really been constructed by an encryption with K, (see extension in Subsection 5.1). To obtain a protocol model where principals may recognize whether a real encryption has been performed one simply extend any cipher with a special fixed field.
We have considered that the intruder can eavesdrop, divert messages, and impersonate other principals. However we can model a more passive intruder, as described in Subsection 5.2, by ensuring that some messages cannot be modified (for instance when a safe channel conveys them).
We have considered secrecy properties. Since correspondence attacks can also be expressed by an execution order and a polynomial number of f orge constraints they can be detected in NP too.
Our procedure can also be adapted to protocols admitting choice points, such as SSL, where a different subprotocol can be executed by a user according to some received message. The modification of our model is described in Subsection 5.3. The detection of an attack remains in NP. We can summarize the known results in the Table 3 .
Finally let us notice that our model remains valid when the intruder is allowed to generate any number of new data. We simply replace in an attack all data that is freshly generated by the intruder by its name Charlie. This implies that in the finite session case, the intruder does not gain any power by creating nonces.
Directions for future work include broadening the scope of our approach to some cases where the number of sessions is unbounded or to commutativity of encryption operators.
